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Abstract
Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simula-
tions rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy.
Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of com-
puter simulations [35, 28], the nature of computer data [3, 20], and the
explanatory power of computer simulations [22, 10]. The aim of this
article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results
of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations
are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem
of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computa-
tional reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer
simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion
of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and
validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of
(un)successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in
simulations.
1 Introduction
In a recent dispute over the philosophical novelty of computer simulations,
Paul Humphreys [19] argued in favor of four genuine philosophical issues that
require the attention of philosophers, namely, epistemic opacity, the seman-
tics of computer simulations, the temporal dynamics of computational pro-
cesses and the distinction in principle/in practice. Of those four issues, this
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article focuses solely on epistemic opacity, arguably the most controversial
issue raised by Humphreys. There are at least two good reasons for paying
attention to epistemic opacity. First, because it is the most direct conse-
quence of the so-called anthropocentric predicament, that is, the claim that
humans have been displaced from the center of production of knowledge.
Thus understood, any epistemological treatment involving computer simu-
lations faces the question of epistemic opacity. Second, because Humphreys
did not offer any suggestions for a solution to epistemic opacity, but rather
restricts his analysis to pointing it out as a philosophically novel issue. In
this context, several questions remain unanswered. For instance, ‘how does
epistemic opacity affect the epistemological treatment of computer simula-
tions?’, ‘in the context of opacity, could it be correct to say that scientists
are overemphasizing the success of simulations?’ [12], and ‘is there a way to
conceive of epistemic opacity coexisting with some form of knowledge?’ This
article aims at addressing these questions and providing a qualitative answer
to epistemic opacity in the context of computer simulations. Furthermore,
it also offers a formal framework to secure claims about knowledge provided
by computer simulations.
To frame the issue within the current philosophical debate, consider the
question of whether epistemic opacity is an unavoidable issue in scientific
practice, and thus is the acceptance of the epistemic superiority of comput-
ers. This point has been recently criticized by Julian Newman, who argues
that epistemic opacity is a non starter for the epistemological treatment of
computer simulations. To him, epistemic opacity is a symptom of modelers
having failed to adopt sound practices of software engineering [30]. Instead,
by means of developing the right engineering and social practices, Newman
argues, modelers would be able to avoid several forms of epistemic opacity
and ultimately reject the assertion that computers are a superior epistemic
authority.1 As he explicitly puts it: “[...] well architected software is not
epistemically opaque: its modular structure will facilitate reduction of ini-
tial errors, recognition and correction of those errors that are perpetrated,
and later systematic integration of new software components” [30, 267].2
1Let us note that Newman takes epistemic opacity as a condition for the anthropocen-
tric predicament. Humphreys, instead, takes epistemic opacity as a consequence of the
anthropocentric predicament. Both interpretations are possible and both find an answer
in this article.
2Many philosophers have engaged with the problem of epistemic opacity and suggested
reliabilism as the most suitable solution, although most of them have not provided a full
fledged account. A shortlist includes [23], [17] and [21], among others. The exception
is [9], who offers an early attempt to reconstruct reliabilism in the context of computer
simulations.
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Although we find Newman’s concerns reasonable, for they are based
on the assumption that knowing how a method works gives insight into its
outcome, we do not agree with his conclusion. Software engineering practices
also promote genuine forms of epistemic opacity. For instance, Timothy
Colburn and Gary Shute claim for new forms of abstraction exclusively for
computer systems that hide but do not neglect specific aspects of the target
system. That is, standard forms of abstraction, idealization and the like
aim at neglecting specific aspects of the target system, while information
hiding consists in hiding “details that are essential in a lower-level processing
context but inessential in a software design and programming context” [7,
176]. Understanding these claims in our context, it is possible to identify
unavoidable degrees of opacity in standard software engineering practice
that come with an agent being unable to relate a given computer program
with its physical instantiation on the computer machine (i.e., information is
hidden to the agent).
A more general solution is therefore required, one that allows researchers
to acknowledge epistemic opacity but not at the expense of losing knowl-
edge. This viewpoint is also shared by other philosophers, such as John
Symons and Jack Horner who argue that although it is impossible to test
the correctness of all possible paths of computer software within any human
timescale, trusting the results of computer software is nevertheless possible
[37]. This article provides precisely such a general solution.
To be more precise, this article offers an alternative analysis to the cur-
rent philosophical treatment on epistemic opacity. In here, a formal frame-
work is developed to the effect of allowing knowledge provided by computer
simulations without rejecting some degrees of epistemic opacity. To this end,
the article first analyzes epistemic opacity and essential epistemic opacity
as presented by [19]. This is the main subject of section 2, where epis-
temic opacity is reconstructed in terms of accessibility and surveyability
conditions on justification. Section 3 elaborates on computational reliabil-
ism, a version of process reliabilism [15] more suitable for accommodating
computer simulations. The aim of this section is to understand the implica-
tions of epistemic opacity for the analysis of knowledge. It is worth noting
that although this article focuses efforts on computer simulations, much of
what is said here can also be extended to other uses of computers provided
that the right methods for grounding computational reliabilism are in place.
Section 4 further elaborates on computational reliabilism by advancing the
four sources that attribute reliability to computer simulations. The last sec-
tion recapitulates the findings and advocates for further issues of genuine
philosophical interest.
3
2 Epistemic Opacity (EO)
In the following, we reconstruct epistemic opacity in terms of accessibility
and surveyability conditions on justification.
2.1 What is epistemic opacity?
Before we give formal definitions of epistemic opacity, we note that it is mo-
tivated by a sceptical line of thought. This is best seen by considering the
following example: take the uncontroversial assumption that human intel-
lect is limited in the sense that it cannot be acquainted with every natural
number – for there are an infinity of them. It is a well known fact that much
of modern mathematical reasoning depends upon properties of infinite sets
(e.g. the statement that every composite number has a prime factorization).
The skeptical challenge is now this: how do mathematicians establish the
truth of general statements which obviously transcend their intellect? They
certainly cannot try out every instance. One way to answer this question
is to employ specific methods such as mathematical induction and proof
by contradiction for conferring the required certainty. The question that
naturally follows is what warrants the validity of those latter methods?
This question concerned early 20th century mathematicians and philoso-
phers in the foundational crisis of mathematics, and has its analogue in the
notion of epistemic opacity that interests us now. While mathematicians
sought to justify their use of infinitary methods, which were at the core of
Hilbert’s programm (see [42] for an overview), we seek to justify computa-
tional methods such as computer simulations. Such computational methods
exceed human abilities in a similar way because they also involve a large
number of steps to be acquainted with.
As mentioned earlier, Humphreys has stated that a general account of
justification – or a full fledged epistemology – for computer systems has
to be non-anthropocentric, that is, computers replace humans in the pro-
cess of justification. The formal definition of epistemic opacity proposed by
Humphreys in [18] and repeated in [19] goes as follows:
[A] process is epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive agent X
at time t just in case X does not know at t all of the epistemically
relevant elements of the process [19, 618]
Concerning Hilbert’s program, it has been debated which methods are
finitary and therefore admissible. In the context of computer systems, and
more specifically to our interests, computer simulations, the question is,
4
which are the exact limitations of the cognitive agent in Humphrey’s defi-
nition. It is clear that this has to do with what the agent can and can not
know. Now, since can is a modal verb, we will give an interpretation of the
modality involved; furthermore, we will also give an account of the epistemic
know.
2.2 Reconstruction
Our reconstruction focuses on “X does not know” as part of the above
definition, and analyzes knowing in terms of accessibility and surveyability.
The central role of justification in the computing process will be argued
for. We note in passing that knowing could also have been analyzed in
terms of JTB. As it is contentious that JTB gives sufficient conditions for
knowledge one would have to resort to a more general reading like JTB+X.
While the role of justification becomes directly apparent in JTB+X due to
the justification clause, we think that avoiding the immediate replacement
know → JTB+X clauses is more charitable to Humphrey’s intentions and
thus allowing for a less contentious interpretation of knowledge.
As we focus on the justificatory aspects of epistemic opacity, we should
clarify what we mean by justification. A simple example could be a (not
necessarily deductive) argument as exemplified in ones (not necessarily de-
ductive) logic of choice. An argument has premises, steps and a conclusion,
with the inference from the premises to the conclusion warranted by some in-
ferential relation. We also allow for informal and non-deductive arguments,
so justification doesn’t have to be truth-preserving nor do we require a for-
mal theory of truth. Though it seems obvious that computational processes
are deductive [4], we don’t require them to be formalized in some specific
logic nor will we attempt to do so.
Let us now begin by emphasizing the last part in Humphreys’ definition
of EO:
[A] process is epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive agent X
at time t just in case X does not know at t all of the epistemically
relevant elements of the process [19, 618]
A process which contains epistemically relevant elements is different from
a causal process or a mere sequence of events. We take this to mean that
such a process can be understood as a justification, which is an epistemic
term in itself. Basically, this means that the epistemically relevant elements
of the process are the steps of the argument giving the justification.
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In the next step we deal with the knowing part of the definition, while
already substituting steps of the justification for epistemically relevant ele-
ments.
[A] process is epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive agent
X at time t just in case X does not know at t all of the steps of
the justification
Taking into account the speed and volume at which justificatory steps
could be generated by computing processes, there are two conditions for how
an agent can fail to know them. She could fail to access each step – maybe
they are generated and discarded so fast that she can not keep up, maybe her
memory is insufficient. But even granting full access to every justificatory
step, will she still be able to check every step according to some predefined
set of rules? In most cases the answer is probably no, since having access
to the steps of a process and checking the validity of an argument are two
different things. All things being equal, the limiting factors to be able to
check a justification are finiteness in length and time. This is exactly what
the concept of surveyablity captures for mathematical proofs [38]. Following
this idea, we say that a justification is surveyable if and only if it is finite in
length and checkable in finite time. Of course the exact amount of finitude
and the meaning of checkability depends on the agent. We will discuss the
application to human agents in the next section.
With these clarifications in mind, our final proposal for the definition
of epistemic opacity including the notions of accessibility and surveyability
now reads:
[A] process is epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive agent
X at time t just in case X at t doesn’t have access to and can’t
survey all of the steps of the justification.
We now see that a justification is epistemically opaque if there is a failure
to justify elements of it. At this point an example of such a computational
process is in order. Consider the execution of a computer program on a
particular machine (i.e. the changes in the physical state of the processor,
the access to ram memory, etc.). The steps involved in the justification
are defined relative to an agent. That is, if one already knows how a half-
adder works, one is allowed to subsume its internal processes and take the
result as justified. Say you know the workings of the basic logical circuitery
of the CPU and the rest of the hardware. You are now going to write
a ‘hello world’ in machine code. Would the execution of this program be
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epistemically opaque to you? The answer is no, and the reason is because
you can give a justification for every step thanks to your previous knowledge
(i.e., of knowing the basic logical circuitery of the CPU and the rest of the
hardware). Naturally, it is easy to imagine programs more complex than a
simple ‘hello world’ on the screen where giving an actual justification would
take too long. The next section tries to capture this aspect of computer
software.
2.3 Strengthening EO with Essential Epistemic Opacity
Essential Epistemic Opacity (EEO) imposes severe restrictions on what
counts as a justification under EO, depending on the reading of (im)possibility
in the following definition:
A process is essentially epistemically opaque to X if and only if
it is impossible, given the nature of X, for X to know all of the
epistemically relevant elements of the process [19, 618]
Translating this definition into our scheme from above, it reads:
A process is essentially epistemically opaque to X if and only if it
is impossible, given the nature of X, for X to have access to and
be able to survey all of the relevant elements of the justification.
For Humphreys EEO is on the practical side of his in principle - in
practice divide. For him it makes a difference whether the agent knows
something or whether he only can know something. Of course his interpre-
tation of the can know has to involve a specific account of modality in which
human limitations come to play.
The standard account in epistemology interprets possibilities as logical
possibilities, meaning that everything that does not imply a contradiction
is therefore possible. This idealizing account of possibilities also affects the
nature of X, insofar as the nature of X should not contain anything which
prevents logical possibilities to be known. Therefore, on the face of it, the
ability of X to access and survey all of the relevant elements, even given its
nature, does not imply a logical contradiction.
To make sense of EEO, therefore, we need to further restrict the notion
of possibility to cover only metaphysical or physical possibilities. For the
metaphysical case, one needs an account for X’s nature or essence which
has been contested at least since Aristotle presented the idea. In the end,
the extension of EEO would have to be set by a dogmatic decree. Now, if
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we want to restrict ourselves to physical possiblities,3 then we have to be
precise about which physical theory is at stake, for Newtonian possiblities
are certainly different from relativistic possibilities.
We propose a common sensical reading of possiblity. For Humphreys,
eligible possibilities are restricted by human action4 which takes place in
finite time and space and is constrained by finite mental capabilities. A
process is EEO if it is impossible for someone to justify epistemically rele-
vant elements of a process under those conditions. Therefore, justifications
themselves are restricted by finite space, time and mental capabilities. This
means that unsurveyablility is a real possibility for such justifications. In
a sense, this claim was already contained in our reformulation of EO, with
the difference that the agent referred to was a generic one while now it is a
human agent. And it is for humans that most processes in (computational)
science are EEO (see [19]). This immediately implies the skeptical challenge
mentioned at the beginning, namely, that if most processes are EEO then
we are not justified in believing their results.
This article holds a different position. At its core, we claim that re-
searchers are justified in believing the results of computational processes,
such as computer simulations, given certain conditions for their reliability.
In the following sections, we flesh out these ideas by introducing computa-
tional reliabilism, a version of process reliabilism that relaxes the demands
for accessibility and surveyability of the computational process and thereby
allows us to regain some human control over justifications.
3 Dissolving EEO with computational reliabilism
As mentioned earlier, a core epistemological concern in studies on computer
simulation is to find grounds for claims about knowledge. That is to say, to
be able to justify the belief that either the results of computer simulations are
3An anonymous reviewer pointed out that those possibilities do not depend on the
physical theory we adopt. Although correct, we also do not have access to physical pos-
siblities outside of any physical theory. If we want to give meaning to epistimic opacity
through physical possibilities, then we have to adopt some physical theory.
4Humphreys says: “For certain philosophical purposes, such as demonstrating that
some kinds of knowledge is impossible even in principle, in principle arguments are fine.
But just as humans cannot in principle see atoms, neither can humans in principle.” [19,
624]. Let it be noted that we have reproduced the quote verbatim. However, we believe
Humphreys meant to say “For certain philosophical purposes, such as demonstrating that
some kinds of knowledge are impossible even in principle, in principle arguments are fine.
But just as humans cannot in practice see atoms, neither can humans in principle [or vice
versa].”
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correct of the target system, that they are valid with respect to our system
of beliefs, or simply that they are employed within their intended uses. This
is a concern that can be found, explicitly or implicitly, in the work of most
philosophers interested in the epistemological input of computer simulations.
Margaret Morrison, for instance, explicitly addresses these concerns in her
treatment of the ‘materiality’ of computer simulations [28], and reuses the
same ideas in her analysis of the role of computer simulations in finding
the Higgs boson [29]. Wendy Parker is another philosopher that has made
explicit her concerns about knowledge and justification in the context of
computer simulations. To her mind, conclusions about the target systems
on the basis of computer simulation results “cannot be automatic, but rather
require justification” [35, 490].
Accepting EEO in computer systems has several consequences of impor-
tance for the epistemological treatment of computer simulations. Perhaps
the most immediate one is that EEO casts doubts on whether researchers
could trust the results of computer simulations at all. But by removing trust
in results, the initial reasons for using computer simulations in scientific and
engineering practice falter. Furthermore, standard philosophical examina-
tion on the experimental value of computer simulations becomes meaningless
[26, 27]. Without the assumption that results of computer simulations are
trustworthy, there are no grounds for claims about their experimental side.
As discussed, a core assumption lying behind EEO is that the justifica-
tion of results requires some form of surveyability of the simulation process.
That is to say, in order to be justified in believing the results of the simula-
tions, researchers must survey every step of the computational process that
leads to such results. But as it has been argued earlier, such surveillance
is indeed impossible and, for our purposes, equally undesirable. Therefore,
a more effective solution needs to be found, one that allows some degree of
reliability to be attributed to the simulation process and, by means of it,
to grant the results the necessary trust. Now, since EEO prevents us from
attributing reliability by means of inspecting the simulation models or by
surveying the process of computing such models, then it must be done by
appealing to procedures external to the simulation itself.
In this context, many philosophers have suggested different sources for
reliability. Claims range from stating that good simulations require well
grounded scientific knowledge [25], to assertions that scientists believe the
results of their simulations because they trust the assumptions upon which
they are built [5]. Although we heartedly endorse these claims, more needs
to be said. Relating computer simulations to well grounded scientific knowl-
edge as well as trusting the assumptions built in are, at best, only necessary
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but not sufficient conditions for attributing reliability to computer simula-
tions. For this reason, we argue that these sources are more diverse and
numerous than those usually discussed in the literature. In this respect, we
offer the first comprehensive review of the sources that attribute reliability
to computer simulations and, by doing so, grant trust to their results. Fur-
thermore, claims about knowledge need to be located within a theoretical
framework that properly articulates these sources and supplies a justification
of the reliability of the computer simulation along with reasons to believe in
their results. To us, such framework comes in the form of a modified version
of Alvin Goldman’s [15] process reliabilism – or reliabilism for short – that
we deem to call computational reliabilism. Let us now try to make sense of
these ideas.
3.1 Computational reliabilism
Let us begin by presenting process reliabilism as elaborated by [15] and [14].
In its simplest form, reliabilism can be expressed in the following way:
(PR) if S ’s believing p at t results from m, then S ’s belief in p
at t is justified.
where S is a cognitive agent, p is any truth-valued proposition,
t is any given time, and m is a reliable process.
Thus understood, according to reliabilism, Peter is justified in believing
that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ because counting small natural numbers is usually a reliable
process. Indeed, there is nothing accidental about the truth of the belief that
‘2 + 2 = 4’ when knowledge is acquired by a reliable reasoning process such
as doing arithmetics under normal circumstances and within a limited set
of operations.
For process reliablism to work, however, it is essential that a reliable
process is not so because it was successful once, but rather because there
is a tendency to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false
ones. Goldman has a simple way to depict reliabilism as “consist[ing] in
the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false”
[15]. His proposal, then, highlights the place that a belief-forming process
has in the steps towards knowledge. Consider the following example offered
by Goldman:
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If a good cup of espresso is produced by a reliable espresso
machine, and this machine remains at one’s disposal, then the
probability that one’s next cup of espresso will be good is greater
than the probability that the next cup of espresso will be good
given that the first good cup was just luckily produced by an
unreliable machine. If a reliable coffee machine produces good
espresso for you today and remains at your disposal, it can nor-
mally produce a good espresso for you tomorrow. The reliable
production of one good cup of espresso may or may not stand
in the singular-causation relation to any subsequent good cup of
espresso. But the reliable production of a good cup of espresso
does raise or enhance the probability of a subsequent good cup
of espresso. This probability enhancement is a valuable property
to have. [15, 28]
The probability here is interpreted objectively, that is, as the chance
that a recorded observation – or a long history of collected data – produces
beliefs that are true rather than false. The core idea of reliabilism is that
if a given process is reliable in one situation, then it is very likely that, all
things being equal, the same process will be reliable in a similar situation.
Thus, Peter is justified in believing that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ because he has been
correct in the past – and, we could add, most likely he will also be correct
in the future. Let it be noted that Goldman is very cautious in demanding
infallibility or absolute certainty for the reliabilist account. Rather, a long-
run frequency or propensity account of probability furnishes the idea of a
reliable production of coffee that increases the probability of a subsequent
good cup of espresso.
Now, one way to reinterpret Goldman’s reliabilism in the context of
computer simulations is to say that researchers are justified in believing the
results of their simulations because there is a reliable process that produces,
most of the time, true beliefs about such results. We can now reinterpret
computational reliabilism in the following terms:
(CR) if S ’s believing p at t results from m, then S ’s belief in p
at t is justified.
where S is a cognitive agent, p is any truth-valued proposition
related to the results of a computer simulation, t is any given
time, and m is a reliable computer simulation.
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Let us note that the formulation of process reliabilism remains largely
unmodified by computational reliabilism, as it is evidenced in (CR). An
important – and rather obvious – difference, however, is that process relia-
bilism is no longer a general account for any p and m, but rather specified
for computational undertakings. In this respect, computational reliabilism
takes that p is a truth-valued proposition related to the results of a com-
puter simulation. These could be particular, such as ‘the results show that
republicans have won,’ ‘the results suggest an increase of temperature in
the Arctic as predicted by theory’, and ‘the results are consistent with ex-
perimental results,’ among others. Alternatively, they could also be general
such as ‘the results are correct of the target system’, ‘the results are valid
with respect to the researcher’s corpus of knowledge’, and ‘the results are
accurate for their intended use.’5 Naturally, the reliable process m is iden-
tified with the computer simulation (see section 3.2 for further differences
with process reliabilism).
We can now assimilate Goldman’s process realibilism into our analysis of
computational reliabilism: researchers are justified in believing the results
of their simulations when there is a reliable process (i.e., the computer sim-
ulation) that yields, most of the time, trustworthy results. More formally,
the probability that the next set of results of a reliable computer simulation
is trustworthy is greater than the probability that the next set of results is
trustworthy given that the first set was produced by an unreliable process
by mere luck [9].
The challenge now is to spell out what makes a computer simulation a
reliable process in the sense given above. To this end, section 4 discusses
four sources for computational reliabilism. However, let us first discuss some
shortcomings of process reliabilism for computer simulations and the reasons
for promoting (CR).
3.2 Justifying computational reliabilism
Earlier, we mentioned that accepting EEO casts doubts on whether re-
searchers could trust the results of computer simulations at all. The chief
argument for EEO is, again, that computer simulations contain so many
5By posing these general propositions, we remain neutral on whether computational
reliabilism should hold commitments to a representationalist viewpoint (e.g., first general
proposition), or to a non-representationalist one (e.g., second and third general propo-
sitions). Furthermore, it is important to notice that we have spelled out computational
reliabilism in a positive form, that is, that if researchers know p then they ‘cannot be
wrong’ about the results. However, and just like process reliabilism, computational relia-
bilism also makes place for the possibility of errors [14].
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steps that they become inaccessible and unsurveyable by a human agent,
and thus their belief in the results are impossible to justify. This is a fun-
damental skeptical concern about knowledge and justification for computer
simulations with the consequences already stated.
Computational reliabilism has been the proposed solution to the skepti-
cal challenge posed by EEO. Taken seriously, however, EEO entails that the
processes that attribute reliability to the simulation could be, in turn, also
epistemically opaque. This is to say that the alleged reliability of computer
simulations could be attributed by an unreliable process. To illustrate this
point, consider that researchers cannot trust the results of a simulation using
the Schelling’s model of segregation if the original distributions are produced
by a pseudo-random generator that produces non-random results (i.e., it is
a non-reliable pseudo-random generator). Trusting the results of computer
simulations, therefore, depends on having a chain of reliable processes that,
in the end, allow researchers to be justified in believing the results.6
Unfortunately, process reliabilism eschews any form of the skeptic’s con-
cerns simply by denying any need for further justification of the reliable
process m. In fact, it is a well known characteristic of process reliabilism
that it rejects any form of regression in the justificatory chain. That is,
whether or not we know that the method by which we attribute reliability
is, in and by itself, reliable, is of no concern to the traditional reliabilist
[14, 6]. In this sense, and always according to process reliabilism, Peter is
justified in believing that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ because he acquired true beliefs by
looking into a textbook on algebra, and algebra is a reliable process as a
matter of fact. There is no need for further justification that algebra is, in
turn, a reliable process.
In its standard form, process reliabilism is inapplicable as a general so-
lution to EEO without providing further restrictions. Specifically, process
reliabilism do not require the agent to know (or to justify) the methods
which produce reliable processes. This is the so called JJ-principle, which
states that in order for a method to yield justified belief, the method too
must be justified [6, 152]. By evading this principle, process reliablism is un-
able to account for the varied justificatory practices as detailed in our paper.
Why scientists concern themselves with verification and validation, robust-
ness analysis, etc. and how the epistemic strength of those methods is to be
evaluated are questions which cannot be answered by process reliabilism. In
computational reliablism, instead, an agent can know something by relying
6This point raises the obvious question of where does this chain of reliable processes
end. Unfortunately, we cannot answer this question here.
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on a reliable method (i.e., the computational process). In this first step, the
JJ-principle is not required, thereby circumventing the skeptical challenge
posed by Humphreys. But as we would also like to allow skepticism about
reliable methods, we reintroduce the JJ-principle in the second step. If a
researcher thinks that a specific verification procedure is reliable, she would
have to adduce reasons for it. In this way, computational reliabilism better
reflects current scientific and engineering practices better.
Thus understood, computational reliabilism requires a ‘retrospective re-
liability chain,’ one that conditions the sources that attribute reliability to
computer simulations to be reliable in and by themselves. This means that
the sources presented in section 4 must be shown to be reliable. For instance,
many verification and validation methods depend, in turn, on mathematics
and the empirical sciences. The history of (un)successful implementations,
on the other hand, is a reliable source insofar as there are well defined the-
ories in the social epistemology and scientific practice that can vouch for
the methods that populate such history. As more sources come into play,
or as the same sources change over time, researchers must sanction their
reliability.
To sum up, computational reliabilism encompasses two specifications
of standard process reliabilism and one amendment. These are, the truth-
valued proposition p, which stands for the results of the computer simulation;
the reliable computer simulation m, which is a specification of the reliable
process; and the series of reliable sources leading to the reliability of m.
4 Sources for computational reliabilism
In the following, we identify four sources for attributing reliability to a
computational process such as computer simulations. It is important to
note that each source offers a different ‘degree of reliability’ to computer
simulations. For instance, expert knowledge by itself is a rather weak source
for the reliability of most computer simulation. The reason for this is that
it could be idiosyncratic in several ways, and therefore not reliable in the
epistemic sense required. Verification and validation methods, on the other
hand, are stronger forms of reliability for they depend on mathematical
machinery and thus are epistemically more secure. This is the reason why
the latter, and not expertise knowledge, are on many occasions decisive
for attributing reliability to computer simulations. Having said this, we
are unable to offer here a measurement of the degree of reliability for each
source. Instead, we offer an analysis of each individual source.
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1. Verification and validation methods
2. Robustness analysis for computer simulations
3. A history of (un)successful implementations
4. Expert knowledge
4.1 Verification and validation
Verification and validation7 are the general names given to a host of methods
used for increasing the reliability of scientific models as well as computer
simulations. Understanding their role, then, turns out to be essential for
attributing reliability to computer simulations.
In verification, it is standard that formal methods are at the center for
the reliability of computer software, whereas in validation benchmarking is
responsible for confirmation of the outcomes [31, Preface]. In verification
methods, then, the relationship of interest is between the specification of a
model and the computer software, whereas in validation methods the rela-
tionship of interest is between computation and the empirical world. Here
are two standard definitions largely accepted and used by the community of
researchers:
Verification: the process of determining that a computational
model accurately represents the underlying mathematical model
and its solution.
Validation: the process of determining the degree to which a
model is an accurate representation of the real world from the
perspective of the intended uses of the model. [34]
In recent philosophical studies, these definitions have been adapted to
include computer simulations. Eric Winsberg, for instance, takes it that
“verification, [...] is the process of determining whether or not the output of
the simulation approximates the true solutions to the differential equations
of the original model. Validation, on the other hand, is the process of de-
termining whether or not the chosen model is a good representation of the
real-world system for the purpose of the simulation” [41, 19-20]. Another
example of a philosopher discussing verification and validation in computer
simulations is Margaret Morrison. Although she agrees with Winsberg that
verification and validation are two methods not always clearly divisible, she
7Also known as ‘internal validity’ and ‘external validity’ or ‘testing’ respectively.
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nevertheless downplays the need for verification methods claiming that val-
idation is a more crucial method for assessing the reliability of computer
simulation [28, 43].
The scientific and computational communities, in contrast, have a more
diverse set of definitions to offer, all tailored to the specificities of the simula-
tion under study. In verification studies, for instance, the literature provides
two methods particularly important for computer simulations. These are
code verification and calculation verification.8 Their importance lies in the
fact that both methods focus on the correctness of the discretization pro-
cedure, a key element for implementing mathematical models as computer
simulations.
William Oberkampf and Timothy Trucano have further argued that it is
useful to segregate code verification into two activities, namely, numerical
algorithm verification and software quality engineering. The purpose of nu-
merical algorithm verification is to address the mathematical correctness of
the implementation of all the numerical algorithms that affect the numer-
ical accuracy of the results of the simulation. The goal of this verification
method is to demonstrate that the numerical algorithms implemented as
part of the simulation model are correctly implemented and performing as
intended [32, 720]. Software quality engineering, on the other hand, sets
the emphasis on determining whether the simulation model is reliable and
produces, most of the time, trustworthy results. The purpose of software
quality engineering is to verify the simulation model and the results of the
simulation on a specific computer hardware, in a specified software environ-
ment – including compilers, libraries, I/O, etc. These verification procedures
are primarily in use during the development, testing, and maintenance of
the simulation model [32, 721].
As for calculation verification, it is generally depicted as the method that
prevents three kinds of errors: human error in the preparation of the code,
human error in the analysis of the results, and numerical errors resulting
from computing the discretized solution of the simulation model. A defini-
tion for calculation verification is “the process of determining the correctness
of the input data, the numerical accuracy of the solution obtained, and the
correctness of the output data for a particular simulation” [34, 34].
The process of validation consists in showing that the results of the
simulation correspond, more or less accurately and precisely, to those ob-
tained by measurement and observation of the target system. Oberkampf
8Also referred to as solution verification in [31, 26], and as numerical error estimation
in [34, 26].
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and Trucano highlight three key aspects of validation methods. These are
“i) quantification of the accuracy of the computational model by comparing
its responses with experimentally measured responses, ii) interpolation or
extrapolation of the computational model to conditions corresponding to
the intended use of the model, and iii) determination if the estimated ac-
curacy of the computational model, for the conditions of the intended use,
satisfies the accuracy requirements specified” [33, 724].
It is important to mention that, with the introduction of computer sim-
ulations in experimental contexts, validation does not exclusively depend on
contrasting results against empirical data. Ajelli and team have shown how
it is possible to run different computer simulations and use their results to
assert their mutual reliability – in this case, there is not a mere convergence
of results, but also of key variables [1], as we argue in section 4.2.
The role of verification and validation methods in attributing reliability
to computer simulations is rather straightforward: on the one hand, they
make sure that the implementation of well established theories is correctly
carried out and not much information is missed; on the other, they provide
good reasons to trust the results of the simulations because they match,
with more or less accuracy, empirical data.
4.2 Robustness analysis for computer simulations
When systems under study are inherently too complex and particular de-
grees of precision and accuracy in idealized models are required but not
delivered by fundamental theories, then robustness analysis becomes a suit-
able alternative method for determining the trustworthiness of results [39,
156].
Robustness analysis, as presented by Richard [24] and further elaborated
by Michael [39] allows researchers to learn about the results of a given model
and whether they are an artifact of it (e.g., due to a poor idealization) or
whether they are related to core features of the model [39, 156]. At its
heart, robustness analysis consists of two steps, the first one consisting in
examining a group of models to determine if they all predict a common result
– called the robust property ; during the second step, models are analyzed
for those structures in the model that generate the sought robust property.
The results from these two steps are combined in order to formulate the
robust theorem, “a conditional statement linking common structure to robust
property, prefaced by a ceteris paribus clause” [39, 158]. It is important to
emphasize that robust theorems do not make claims about the frequency
with which the robust property occur in target systems. Rather, it makes
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the conditional claim about what happens if a model is instantiated in an
specific way [39, 169].
Following Weisberg, the ideal case of robustness analysis requires re-
searchers to examine a group of similar but distinct models in search of a
robust behavior. The aim of such an examination is to formulate sufficiently
diverse models in such a way that the discovery of a robust property is not
due to mere luck in the way the models were analyzed but rather because
the property is actually there [39, 158]. The question now is how to formu-
late such diverse models. Weisberg suggests a list of possibilities, none of
which consists of changes in the parametrization of the model and of initial
and boundary conditions, but in significant modifications to the structure
of the model. Reinterpreting these possibilities in terms of modification in
computer simulations, they include varying the regularity of the grid, vary-
ing the number of attributes of a process, and varying the heterogeneity of
the utility function, among others.
Let us note that Weisberg’s analysis of robustness relies on the number of
(heterogeneous) models that researchers are able to create. The more models
available, the more likely it is that the robust property identified across
models can actually be found in a real-world system [39, 160ff]. In computer
simulations, the computational power allows researchers to produce a large
number of heterogeneous models at a relatively low cost (e.g., in terms of
human resources, money, time, etc.). In this sense, inferring that a robust
property is present in the simulation models, and therefore that the core
structure is giving rise to such a property, is a much simpler task with
computer simulations.
Now, the core assumption in robustness analysis is that if a sufficiently
heterogeneous set of models give rise to a property, then it is very likely that
the real-world phenomenon also shows the same property. Furthermore, ro-
bustness analysis allows researchers to infer that, when the robust property
is observed in a real-world system, then it is very likely that the core struc-
ture of the computer simulation corresponds to the causal structure giving
rise to the real-world phenomenon. Robustness analysis, therefore, is a key
player in the process of attributing reliability to computer simulations.
Consider the following example of robustness analysis in computer simu-
lations. Ajelli et al. provide a side-by-side comparison of two computer sim-
ulations, a stochastic agent-based model and a structured meta-population
stochastic model (GLobal Epidemic and Mobility - GLEaM). The agent-
based model includes an explicit representation of the Italian population
through highly detailed data on the socio-demographic structure. In addi-
tion, and for determining the probability of commuting from municipality
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to municipality, Ajelli et al. use a general gravity model used in trans-
portation theory. However, the epidemic transmission dynamics is based on
an ILI (Influenza-like Illness) compartmentalization, which in turn is based
on stochastic models that integrate susceptible, latent, asymptomatic infec-
tions, and symptomatic infections [1, 5]. The authors define their agent-
based model as “a stochastic, spatially-explicit, discrete-time, simulation
model where the agents represent human individuals [...] One of the key fea-
tures of the model is the characterization of the network of contacts among
individuals based on a realistic model of the socio-demographic structure of
the Italian population.” [1, 4] The authors also mention that both GLEaM
and the agent-based model are dynamically calibrated in that they share
exactly the same initial and boundary conditions [1, 6].
On the other hand, GLEaM is a multiscale mobility network based on
high-resolution population data that estimates the population with a reso-
lution given by cells of 15 x 15 minutes of arc. Balcan et al. explain that a
typical GLEaM consists of three data layers. A first layer, where the popula-
tion and mobility allows the partition of the world into geographical regions.
This partition defines a second layer, the subpopulation network, where the
inter-connection represents the fluxes of individuals via transportation in-
frastructures and general mobility patterns. Finally, and superimposed onto
this layer, is the epidemic layer, that defines inside each subpopulation the
disease dynamic [2]. In the study by Ajelli et al., GLEaM also represents
a grid-like partition where each cell is assigned the closest airport. The
subpopulation network uses geographic census data, and the mobility lay-
ers obtain data from different databases, including the International Air
Transport Association database consisting in a list of airports worldwide
connected by direct flights.
By increasing spatial resolution, changing grid size, the topography of
the network, internal functions, and several other structures – tailored to
what each model can offer to alter – Ajelli et al. are able to identify a series
of robust properties and thus elaborate a series of robust theorems.9 To
illustrate just one case, Ajelli et al. reported to have found that the two
9A further point to evaluate is whether identifying differences in what should be a
robust property is epistemically as relevant as identifying a robust property. The former
requires an evaluation by the researchers of what should be a robust property whereas the
later is somehow provided by the simulation model. To Ajelli et al. identifying similar-
ities and differences both work towards the reliability of their computer simulation: “we
investigated and quantified similarities and differences in the results at different scales of
resolution, and related those to the assumptions of the frameworks and to their integrated
data” [1, 11]
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computer simulations “display a very good agreement in the timing of the
epidemic, with a very limited variation in the time of the simulated epi-
demic activity peaks. In the metapopulation approach the fraction of the
population affected by the epidemic is larger (by 5% to 10%) than in the
agent-based approach. This difference is due to the assumption of homo-
geneity and thus the lack of detailed structure of contacts (besides the age
structure) in the metapopulation approach with respect to the agent-based
approach” [1, 11]. In this case, robustness analysis provides good reasons to
believe that core structures in GLEaM and the agent-base simulation corre-
spond very well to the actual timing of the epidemic. Researchers are thus
justified in believing claims about results of these simulations – and from
those created from these two simulations.
4.3 A history of (un)successful implementations
The history of science offers a long record of successes and accomplishments,
as well as failures and incompetence. What does such a disruptive history tell
us about the scientific enterprise? In the context of experimental practice,
Ian [16] and Peter [13] have argued that mature science has been, by and
large, cumulative since the seventeenth century. Such a claim builds on the
idea that (un)successful implementation of a theory, a model, or even two
chemicals in a laboratory setup are part of the corpus of knowledge as much
as the theory, the model, and the two chemicals in question.
Something very similar can be said about the success, failure and cu-
mulative nature of computer simulations. The simulation model as a whole
is conceptualized, designed, programmed and executed in a series of stages
that do not remain constant over time [11]. In each stage, the knowledge
relied upon to devise each method comes from a wide range of domains,
including mathematics, logic and computer theory, sociology and cognitive
psychology. Over time, techniques are improved upon, reconfigured, and
radically revised when the technology changes or a new method is envis-
aged. For instance, design prototyping is a sub-field of software engineering
that helps developers assess alternative design strategies and decide which
is best for a particular project. There are no standard methods for choosing
the best strategy, but rather the designers may address the requirements
of the simulation with several different design approaches to see which has
the best properties. For instance, a simulation involving networking may
be built as a ring in one prototype and as a star in another, and perfor-
mance characteristics evaluated to see which structure is better at meeting
performance goals or constraints [36, Chapter 5]. In this respect, for some
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cases the best option will be to draw from a body of successful implemen-
tations (e.g., of successful implementations of ring networking simulations);
for some other cases, a new strategy will populate such a body (e.g., failures
in communication protocols, and the success in a new networking topology).
In both cases, they integrate a history of (un)successful implementations.
This is, we believe, part of what [25] have in mind when they claim that
the epistemic reliability of computer simulations come from the credentials
supplied by well grounded scientific knowledge. Although we agree with this
claim, we must keep in mind that the methodology of computer simulations
is dynamic and non-hierarchical. That is to say that researchers make con-
stant changes to their simulations, rather than merely implementing a well
grounded theory once and for all. It is also to say that well grounded scien-
tific knowledge is, to today’s scientific standards, also knowledge generated
by computer simulations. In this vein, well grounded scientific knowledge
depends as much on computer simulations as the latter depend on scientific
knowledge. Naturally, such a dynamism in the methodology might intro-
duce sources of unreliability (e.g., using a method that has been historically
successful in one domain into a complete different domain). However, the
simulation model itself is, at some point, methodologically stabilized – as
opposed to constant tinkering.
In this respect, we follow Eric Winsberg who, borrowing in turn from
Hacking, claimed that building techniques have their own life for “they carry
with them their own history of prior (un)successes and accomplishments,
and, when properly used, they can bring to the table independent warrant for
belief in the models they are used to build” [40, 122]. We include such history
of (un)successful implementations as an important source for attributing
reliability to computer simulations.
4.4 Expert knowledge
The last source we offer here for computer reliabilism can be found in the dif-
ferent disciplines that constitute Science and Technology Studies. In there,
a great deal of attention is put on understanding the notion and role of ex-
perts in science and engineering. Harry Collins and Robert Evans argue that
standard theories of expertise (e.g., the relational theory of expertise, which
take expertise to be a matter of the experts’ relations with other experts
[8, 2]) fall short in a series of respects. They usually provide no guidance
on how to legitimize and identify the experts nor how to choose between
competing experts (see the periodic table of expertises [8, 14]); furthermore
they leave out of consideration the analysis of the citizen’s role in techno-
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logical decision-making and, if the proper measures are not in place, they
can be dangerously idiosyncratic. Collins and Evans propose as alternative
the realist theory, which takes that expertise is some sort of attribute or
possession that groups of experts have and that individuals acquire through
their membership of those groups. “Acquiring expertise” Collin and Evans
conclude, “is therefore a social process – a matter of socialization into the
practices of an expert group – and expertise can be lost if time is spent away
from the group” [8, 3].
To us, the expert is interpreted in the realist mode proposed by Collin
and Evans, with the condition that having membership of a given group does
not mean strict participation in that group. Thus, to us the mathematician
and physicist that know the underlying theory that will be implemented as
a simulation very well, but know nothing about the implementation itself,
are as much an expert in the computer simulation as the computer scientist
that knows how to implement the theory but little or nothing about the
theory itself.
As Claus Beisbart indicates, scientists believe the results of their sim-
ulations because they trust the assumptions upon which such simulations
are built [5]. These assumptions are here interpreted as being suggested
and approved by the relevant actors, that is, the experts. Furthermore,
by and large scientists believe the results of their simulations because they
fall within an expected range. Marco Ajelli et al. provide us with a good
example of the interplay between the assumptions built into the simulation
model and what experts typically anticipate. To Ajelli et al. “[t]he epidemic
size profile shows an expected overall mismatch of 5-10% depending on the
reproductive rate, which is induced by the homogeneous assumption of the
metapopulation strategy” [1, 2].
With these ideas in mind, it is possible to argue that the expert is a key
contributor to the reliability of computer simulations:10 the theory and as-
sumptions built into the simulation, along with the implicit theory support-
ing the computation largely depend on the experts, and/or they determine
the range within which results can be accepted.
Expert knowledge also plays an important role in determining the robust-
ness of a simulation as well as in participating in a history of (un)successful
implementations. In the latter case, because they are the main actors in cre-
ating such (un)successful history. In the former case, because the expert’s
abilities to identify and judge relevantly similar structures is paramount for
10Let us keep in mind that expert knowledge is also a source for a variety of errors.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
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claims about robust properties. According to Weisberg, there are occasions
where researchers rely on judgment and experience, not mathematics or sim-
ulation, to determine whether a common structure gives rise to the robust
behavior as well as judge whether the common structure contains important
mathematical similarities as opposed to just intuitive qualitative similari-
ties [39, 159]. Ajelli et al. again offer an interesting assertion that combines
claims about robustness and the modeling assumptions advanced by experts:
“[t]he good agreement of the two approaches [i.e., the agent-based simula-
tion and the GLEaM simulation] reinforces the message that computational
approaches are stable with respect to different data integration strategies
and modeling assumption” [1, 2]
5 Final remarks
If the philosophical novelty of computer simulations is a matter of contro-
versy, we hope that this article evidenced that more philosophical efforts
need to be channeled towards a better understanding of simulations. The
EEO is just one issue proposed for a genuine philosophy of computer simula-
tions. To the few attempts to answer it, we suggested a peaceful coexistence
between accepting EEO and reasons for having genuine knowledge provided
by computer simulations.
Although our approach builds much from past research on justification
and theories of knowledge, it is new in at least three different ways. First,
because it is the only account that takes EEO seriously and proposes an
effective solution to it in terms of theories of knowledge; second, because it
attends to some shortcomings that process reliabilism has in the context of
computer simulations (hence, renaming it computational reliabilism); and
third, because it is the only work in the literature that systematically and
qualitatively addresses the sources that attribute reliability to computer
simulations.
Having mentioned these merits, we must also acknowledge the limita-
tions of our approach. For starters, more needs to be said about the sources
attributing computational reliability. Whereas our treatment has been gen-
eral, some specific work would shed more light on the methods for attribut-
ing reliability to computer simulations. For instance, addressing verification
methods exclusively for computer simulations will help to understand bet-
ter the degree to which they are absolutely necessary in the assessment of
their reliability. Similarly, to the argument here advanced, it is important
to factor in the specific uses of computer simulations. In climate science, for
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instance, expert knowledge has a more epistemically prominent place than
validation methods because the scarcity of data makes the justification of
the simulation via validation a rather difficult task. This is, of course, not
to say that we must accept weaker standards of verification and validation
for climate science. Rather that the justification of certain simulations, such
as in climate science, comes by and large from expertise knowledge.11
All in all, we expect to have provided a formal account of how to address
and solve the skeptic’s challenge that follows by taking EEO seriously in the
context of computer simulations.
References
[1] Marco Ajelli, Bruno Gonc¸alves, Duygu Balcan, Vittoria Colizza, Hao
Hu, Jose´ J. Ramasco, Stefano Merler, and Alessandro Vespignani. Com-
paring Large-Scale Computational Approaches to Epidemic Modeling:
Agent-Based versus Structured Metapopulation Models. BMC Infec-
tious Diseases, 10(190):1–13, 2010.
[2] Duygu Balcan, Vittoria Colizza, Bruno Gon¸calves, Hao Hu, Jose´ J
Ramasco, and Alessandro Vespignani. Multiscale mobility networks and
the spatial spreading of infectious diseases. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106(51):21484–
21489, 2009.
[3] Anouk Barberousse and Vorms Marion. Computer simulations and
empirical data. In Juan M. Dura´n and Eckhart Arnold, editors, Com-
puter Simulations and the Changing Face of Scientific Experimentation.
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.
[4] Claus Beisbart. How can computer simulations produce new knowl-
edge? European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2:395–434, 2012.
[5] Claus Beisbart. Are computer simulations experiments? and if not,
how are they related to each other? European Journal for Philosophy
of Science, pages 1–34, 2017.
[6] Alexander Bird. Philosophy of Science. Routledge, 1998.
[7] Timothy Colburn and Gary Shute. Abstraction in computer science.
Minds and Machines, 17(2):169–184, 2007.
11We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us clarify this point.
24
[8] Harry Collins and Robert Evans. Rethinking Expertise. University of
Chicago Press, 2007.
[9] Juan M. Dura´n. Explaining Simulated Phenomena: A Defense of the
Epistemic Power of Computer Simulations. PhD thesis, Universita¨t
Stuttgart, 2014.
[10] Juan M. Dura´n. Varying the explanatory span: scientific explanation
for computer simulations. International Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, 31(1):27–45, 2017.
[11] Juan M. Dura´n. Computer Simulations in Science and Engineering.
Concepts - Practices - Perspectives. Springer, 2018. ISBN Pending.
[12] Roman Frigg and Julian Reiss. The philosophy of simulation: Hot new
issues or same old stew? Synthese, 169(3):593–613, 2009.
[13] Peter Galison. Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics.
University of Chicago Press, 1997.
[14] Alvin Goldman and Bob Beddor. Reliabilist epistemology. In Ed-
ward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Meta-
physics Research Lab, Stanford University, winter 2016 edition, 2016.
[15] Alvin I. Goldman. Justification and Knowledge, chapter What is Jus-
tified Belief?, pages 1–23. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, 1979.
[16] Ian Hacking. On the Stability of the Laboratory Sciences. The Journal
of Philosophy, 85(10):507–514, 1988.
[17] Hans Hasse and Johannes Lenhard. Boon and bane: On the role of
adjustable parameters in simulation models. In Johannes Lenhard and
M. Carrier, editors, Mathematics as a Tool, pages 93–115. Boston Stud-
ies in the History and Philosophy of the Sciences, 2017.
[18] Paul W Humphreys. Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Em-
piricism, and Scientific Method. Oxford University Press, 2004.
[19] Paul W. Humphreys. The philosophical novelty of computer simulation
methods. Synthese, 169(3):615–626, 2009.
[20] Paul W. Humphreys. What are data about? In Juan M. Dura´n and
Eckhart Arnold, editors, Computer Simulations and the Changing Face
of Scientific Experimentation. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.
25
[21] Andreas Kaminski, Michael Resch, and Uwe Ku¨ster. Jahrbuch Tech-
nikphilosophie, chapter Mathematische Opazita¨t. U¨ber Rechtfertigung
und Reproduziertbarkeit in ther Computersimulation, pages 257–281.
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2017.
[22] Ulrich Krohs. How digital computer simulations explain real-world pro-
cesses. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 22(3):277–
292, 2008.
[23] Johannes Lenhard and Eric Winsberg. Holism, entrenchment, and the
future of climate model pluralism. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science Part B - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,
41(3):253–262, 2010.
[24] Richard Levins. The strategy of model building in population biology.
American scientist, 54(4):421–431, 1966.
[25] Michela Massimi and Wahid Bhimji. Computer simulations and exper-
iments: The case of the Higgs Boson. Studies in History and Philos-
ophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics, 51:71–81, 2015.
[26] Mary S Morgan. Experiments without material intervention. In Hans
Radder, editor, The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, pages
216–235. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.
[27] Mary S Morgan. Experiments versus models: New phenomena, infer-
ence and surprise. Journal of Economic Methodology, 12(2):317–329,
2005.
[28] Margaret Morrison. Models, measurement and computer simulation:
The changing face of experimentation. Philosophical Studies, 143(1):33–
57, 2009.
[29] Margaret Morrison. Reconstructing Reality. Models, Mathematics, and
Simulations. Oxford University Press, 2015.
[30] Julian Newman. Epistemic opacity, confirmation holism and techni-
cal debt: Computer simulation in the light of empirical software en-
gineering. In International Conference on History and Philosophy of
Computing, pages 256–272. Springer, 2015.
[31] William L. Oberkampf and Christopher J. Roy. Verification and vali-
dation in scientific computing. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
26
[32] William L Oberkampf and Timothy G Trucano. Verification and Vali-
dation in Computational Fluid Dynamics, volume 38. 2002.
[33] William L Oberkampf and Timothy G Trucano. Verification and vali-
dation benchmarks. Nuclear Engineering and Design, 238(3):716–743,
2008.
[34] William L Oberkampf, Timothy G Trucano, and Charles Hirsch. Ver-
ification, validation, and predictive capability in computational engi-
neering and physics. Technical report, Sandia National Laboratories,
2003.
[35] Wendy S Parker. Does matter really matters? Computer simulations,
experiments, and materiality. Synthese, 169(3):483–496, 2009.
[36] Shari Lawrence Pfleeger and Joanne M. Atlee. Software Engineering:
Theory and Practice. Prentice Hall, 2009.
[37] John Symons and Jack Horner. Software intensive science. Philosophy
& Technology, 27(3):461–477, 2014.
[38] T. Tymoczko. Computer use to computer proof: A rational recon-
struction. The Two-Year College Mathematics Journal, 12(2):120–125,
1981.
[39] Michael Weisberg. Simulation and Similarity. Oxford University Press,
2013.
[40] Eric Winsberg. Simulated experiments: Methodology for a virtual
world. Philosophy of Science, 70:105–125, 2003.
[41] Eric Winsberg. Science in the Age of Computer Simulation. University
of Chicago Press, 2010.
[42] Richard Zach. Hilbert’s program. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition). 2016.
27
